Outlook 2021 +

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COVID-19 has not altered the challenges, but there is a clear shift in focus.

Market trends in theRefining, Petrochemicals and Energy segments

In many respects, 2020 was an unprecedented year. The outbreak of the pandemic in the first quarter and general social distancing led to the sharpest global decline in economic activity since World War II. As a consequence of mobility restrictions, demand for liquid fuels hit all-time lows, which had an instant impact on the crude oil market, pushing oil prices below production costs. The three largest oil producers (the US, OPEC and Russia) had no choice but to cooperate. The biggest ever production cuts (10 mbd) agreed between OPEC and Russia, combined with the US production decrease (of more than 3 mbd over a year) caused by the price slump, helped to adapt crude oil supply levels to demand for liquid fuels, which gradually started to recover as the mobility restrictions were eased. As refineries did not reduce their throughput capacities in response to the major decrease in demand, capacity utilisation rates fell to record lows, driving refining margins below production profitability thresholds.

The outbreak of the pandemic and its direct consequences triggered a dramatic shift in the economic, social and political agenda. Significant changes can be seen, for example, in the approach to climate protection, especially in terms of increased awareness and sense of responsibility for climate among businesses, regulators and consumers. A growing number of companies are announcing strategies to achieve carbon neutrality, embarking on carbon reduction programmes, or looking for sustainable ESG financing for green investment projects. On September 9th 2020, PKN ORLEN, as the first oil company in Central and Eastern Europe, made a declaration to become a net zero business by 2050.

Economic Forum 2020Karpacz, September 9, 2020 'The global energy transition that is taking placebefore our eyes is a huge development opportunityfor Central Europe. As the largest company in theregion, we want to increase out involvment, in thisprocess and we are well positioned to do it.' Ceo and President of PKN ORLEN S.A. Managment Board Daniel Obajtek By 2050 ORLEN Group wants to achieve emissions neutrality 2030 2020 Net CO2emissions 2050 Operationalobjective 2030 Net zeroemissions 2050 -33% CO2 / MWhin the power industry Zero net emissions -20% CO2 in a petrochemical refinery1
image/svg+xml Ambitious transformation goals have been announced by almost all leading fuel companies Current vision/mission statements of oil sector leaders and emission reduction pledges Current vision/mission statement Medium-term emissionreduction target 2030 Emission reductiontarget 2050 'Leaders in energy transition' Reduction of CO2 emissions -20% Reduction of greenhousegas in Norway 'Shaping the future of energy' -40% Emissions reduction 'Reimagining energy' -20% Emissions reduction 'Creating value throug the energy transition' -30% Reduction of CO2 emissions 'Delivering energy responsibly' -20% Reduction of CO2 emissions 'To become the responsible energy major' -15% Reduction of CO2 emissions 'Fuelling the future' -20% Net-zeroemissions

This refocusing also involves change in strategic and business thinking among businesses, which until recently had been based on long-term analyses and forecasts underpinned by a sense of control over the world, nature or human capacity to mitigate adverse developments.

An event without precedent, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, led to a sudden upheaval of the existing economic and social order (equilibrium), sometimes referred to as ‘the normal’. Previously, strategic thinking was based on the expectation that after some time, as a result of adjustments, a new order, ‘a new normal’, would emerge, giving rise to a new state of equilibrium for which one could prepare strategically. Now we need to take into account that the technological acceleration and the pace of social change brought by the fourth industrial revolution as well as excessive exploitation of the natural environment may lead to further unseen developments (black swans), both positive (e.g. new technologies) and negative (e.g. consequences of climatic warming). Such events may take place so frequently that there will not be enough time for things to reach a new normal. Moreover, after each such shock the world may head towards another new order, another new normal, which simply cannot be reached.

We will live in a world of increasingly frequent, unpredictable and revolutionary changes for which we will not be able to prepare in the same way in which we prepared for an anticipated decline in demand, increase in prices or fiercer competition. Instead, we will have to learn to quickly respond to more and more frequent, unpredictable and perplexing changes. In this new reality, the most important challenge for businesses will be to switch the strategic thinking from preparation for an anticipated change to rapid response to unexpected developments. This will be supported by progressing digitisation, especially in areas related to agile management, as it facilitates quick impact assessments based on companies’ digital twins. In practice, the rapid response capacity will depend on maintaining appropriate reserves in many areas.

 

However, the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and successive black swans will not change the fundamental development challenge stemming from the rising consumption of energy and material goods with a rapidly growing population. The challenge lies in changing the relationship between humans and nature. In 1900, there were 1.6 billion people in the world, in 1950 – 2.5 billion, and now (2020) the world’s population is 7.5 billion. It is no longer possible to manage natural resources as we used to do, especially that the population is growing exponentially. We are at a point in history where the logic of short-term profit maximisation and exploitation of natural resources can no longer be pursued. Therefore, energy transition assumes working towards synergies between humans and nature instead of ruthless exploitation.

The world is undergoing fundamental changes making a structural impact on the energy sector1

Energy transition:inevitability and opportunity for growth

For the past few years, we have been witness to a slowdown in the growth rate of demand for crude oil due to the ongoing electrification of passenger transport, improved efficiency of internal combustion engines, and a growing share of biocomponents, alternative fuels and alternative modes of transport. This is occurring alongside forecasts of declining demand for crude oil and liquid fuels and the world approaching ‘peak oil’. OECD countries have already reached a peak in oil demand, and according to some scenarios global demand for crude oil and liquid fuels will never recover to the pre-2019 levels. The prospects of a shrinking market, social, regulatory and financial pressures on rapid decarbonisation of transport and the size of oil resources already discovered are not conducive to investment in oil production or the refining industry as businesses fear stranded assets. What discourages investment in the oil and gas sector are increasingly frequent steep price declines caused by the occurrence of sustained periods of oversupply, be that due to new technologies (unconventional and deep-sea mining) or reduced demand in the wake of such events as the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, many international oil and gas companies are limiting investment in exploration and production assets or abandoning it altogether.

image/svg+xml The financial results of the classic oil industry will definitely deterioratein the next decades... Existing business areas of fuel and energy companies: Oil explorationand production Natural gasexplorationand production Oilprocessing Petrochemicalproduction Retailfuel sales Coal-firedenergy Global growth outlook 2020 - 2040 (CAGR) Global growth outlook for the long term 0.7% 0.7% -1.0% 1.1% 1.5% 2.9%

On the other hand, new renewable energy sources are becoming fully competitive in terms of prices (e.g. wind power) or increasingly competitive because of the growing scale and technological progress (e.g. solar PV systems). The potential of renewable energy sources is fostered by the rising popularity of prosumer Energy. A great advantage of electricity production based on non-depletable energy resources is the stability and predictability of generation costs (depreciation of Energy, storage and transmission facilities).

The main factor enabling the energy transformation is the consistent decline in the costs of generating energy from renewable sources

image/svg+xml Global weighted average levelised cost of electricityby renewable Energy technology [USD/kWh]* Fossil fuel cost range *CSP plant relies on an array of mirrors and lenses to generate power 2010 2019 0.09 0.05 Onshorewind 2010 2019 0.12 0.15 Offshorewind 0.07 2010 2019 0.38 Solarphotovoltaic 2010 2019 0.35 0.16 Concentratedsolarpower* 91% 46% 54% 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 2020 2030 2040 2050 9% Projected degree of electrificationof the mature EU economy by 2050 [%]

Investment in renewable energy sources is driven by the growing environmental awareness of the general public, reflected in new, ambitious climate objectives set in new agreements (Paris Agreement, New Green Deal, RED II in the EU, restrictions on the production of disposable packaging) aimed at driving progress towards energy transition. Currently, the countries that have made a commitment to achieve net zero carbon footprint by 2050–2060 (China, the European Union, Canada, Japan, South Korea), including the US, which is likely to make a similar declaration, account for 65% of global emissions. The list of oil and gas companies making this commitment is also growing. Finally, we are witnessing change in customer expectations, including preference for digital distribution channels and tailored product offering with information on carbon footprint.

The energy transition pertains to both the demand and supply side. It should be clearly stated that the most difficult task is to decarbonise energy used for private consumption. Energy is not consumed directly. The change of primary energy sources in consumption involves costly replacement of energy receivers (heating furnaces, gas cookers, cars and vehicles with combustion engines) with new, electricity-powered and more cost-effective ones. The new innovative solutions proposed by industry must find buyers. And if the transition is to be successful, these must be mass buyers, including those with low incomes. The efforts to switch private consumption to green energy will be supported by new business models (use instead of own, product as a service) which make it possible to finance the total cost of energy in households from current expenditure, without having to make costly capital investments to replace equipment and appliances. These models also help close the loop in materials management systems and, by meeting consumer needs while ensuring lower consumption of materials per capita, contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Energy plays a leading role in energy transition. The share of electricity in global demand for energy is steadily growing. Electrification is also helped by the progress in digitisation since all things digital are powered by electricity. If all energy receivers were electrical, which is what in fact the European Union aims to achieve, decarbonisation of energy used by end consumers would effectively consist in decarbonisation of Energy. Decarbonisation in the Energy industry is not only progressing faster than in households (private consumption), but it is also quicker in embracing technological game changers that will transform the sector. The likely game changers are efficient batteries with a high energy density and stationary energy storage facilities based on hydrogen technologies, which will make it possible to phase out natural gas, currently used as a back-up fuel in zero-emission Energy. Calling natural gas a transitional fuel is an expression of faith in the power of the human mind and in new technologies, which may emerge quite soon, but their development will take another 20 to 30 years. There are many indications that those technologies will present a breakthrough in generation, storage and distribution of electricity.

The International Energy Agency expects that demand for green energy in 2018–2040 will be increasing at a blistering rate of nearly 7% annually. The second important source of zero-emission energy is nuclear energy. Demand for nuclear energy in 2018–2040 is set to grow at approximately 2% per year, much faster than demand for natural gas.

Renewable energy sources will prevail in the global energy mix in the coming years

image/svg+xml Average annual growth in global primary energy demandin 2018-2040, by fuel type(%) 6.9 1.6 1.0 1.9 1.5 0.5 0.1 Natural gas Crude oil Nuclear Coal Biomass Hydropower RES Source: IEA World Energy Outlook 2019, OPEC World Oil Outlook 2019

However, a complete transition from molecules to electrons is impossible with the current state of knowledge and technology. Having no access to electricity carriers (storage systems) with sufficient energy density, we may not phase out usable energy generation based on burning fossil fuels completely, and the process entails carbon dioxide emissions. Two significant areas where obtaining energy from combustion will be necessary are the Energy industry, as mentioned above, where burning natural gas will be indispensable for a period of time, and transport, in particular heavy duty vehicle transport, which will continue to use liquid fuels produced from crude oil for many years to come.

The petrochemical industry will remain an important buyer of crude oil. The world needs materials and research shows that petrochemical materials have a considerable advantage over alternative materials, in terms of both their utility value and their impact on climate and the environment. For example, the climate and carbon footprint of packaging obtained from petrochemical raw materials in the full circle is comparable to the footprint left by alternative packaging, but its weight is four times lower and this is what makes plastic packaging less harmful. But on one condition, namely that it is not discarded once used, but put back in circulation.The outlook for the circular economy, which starts from designing objects and equipment that are durable, upgradeable and easily repairable and can finally be disassembled into recyclable components, in combination with business models of a product as a service, as well as material as a service, places the petrochemical sector on a high place in the ranking of rapidly growing industries. Another advantage of petrochemicals in circular economy is energy consumption savings due to a significant reduction in the weight of products, machinery, equipment and structures that use petrochemical materials, compared to alternative materials. This leads to lower energy consumption and lower emissions compared with alternative materials2.

For more information, see https://ffbk.orlen.com/files/Raport/Orlen_zeszyt_12_EN_FINAL.pdf

Energy transition will take place at different rates in different regions of the world, depending on access to new technologies, consumer preferences and the ability to fulfil those preferences (i.e. wealth and transfers), and on the quality of climate and environmental regulations, which depends on ambitions, predictability, implementation and international coordination. The energy transition cannot be implemented single-handedly, in isolation.

The changes in Europe are creating new areas of value, and the pace of change in our region will be favourable to PKN ORLEN. For example, between 2019 and 2030 demand for liquid fuels in Europe will decrease from 15 mbd to 11 mbd, that is by 30%. Based on our calculations, in Central Europe3 demand for fuels in the same period will not change – it will remain at about 1 mbd. Installed gas-fired Energy capacity in Europe will be growing at a slow pace until 2030, while in Central Europe this increase will be significant, ranging from 40% to 50%. Also installed renewable Energy capacity in Central Europe will increase much more (100%) than in Europe (20%).

3 Central Europe comprises the following countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

2030 2019 Europe ~15 ~11 ~0.7x 2030 2019 Central Europe1 ~0.9 ~0.9 ~1.0x Crude oil Fuel demand [mln b/d] 2030 2019 Europe ~495 ~600 ~1.2x 2030 2019 Central Europe1 ~37 ~70-75 ~2x RES Installed RES capacity [GW] 2030 2019 Europe ~205 ~215 ~1.0-1.1x 2030 2019 Central Europe1 ~12 ~17 ~1.4-1.5x Natural gas Installed gas-fired energy capacity [GW] 1. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia; Source: IEA, ENTSO-E, IRENA, PEP2040, ARE

Energy transition opens new attractive opportunities for companies in the fuel and energy sector, but to capture the opportunities there must be a change in strategic thinking about development and organisations must be prepared to operate in an uncertain environment.

Uncertainties related tothe energy transition

One can prepare for the expected. Uncertainty brings events which are surprising and require a rapid response and redeployment of forces and resources.

Energy transition is inevitable, and we know its overriding objective, which is to restore a balance between humans and nature. We know the numerical goal for 2050: Net Zero Emissions. However, we do not know what paths we will follow to achieve this goal.The further we go, the more uncertainties we encounter.

The Net Zero Emissions horizon reaches into the sphere of technological uncertainty. It remains unknown what technologies will prevail in the energy sector after 2030 – what will be the role of utility energy generation and that of prosumer generation? How will energy receivers used by end consumers develop?

The energy sector is unlike the IT sector, where needs and technologies are changing at a record pace, not just keeping pace with, but staying ahead of consumer preferences. In the energy sector, things are different. Change is slow – it does not even take years; it takes decades. Consumers want to be supplied with green energy and to phase out energy from combustion, but this cannot happen overnight. And not because the energy sector is populated by snails and turtles. The change is taking so long because of the long life of the units, machinery and equipment used to generate energy and transform it into a utility. This inertia has serious consequences.

Energy transition requires financial resources. Therefore, over the next ten years we must be able to make money on what we have, generating maximum value from our existing assets while meeting the declared emission reduction targets. This is needed in order to exploit those assets while they are still generating value, which we believe will be at least another 10 years.

However, we are aware that the success of energy transition mostly hinges on technologies and business models that are yet to be invented, designed and implemented.

These include:

  • efficient large-scale energy storage and new mobility, which are linked by hydrogen technologies;
  • meeting the needs of a growing population with various materials. The technologies and business models for recycling and circular economy are helpful in this respect, as the goal is to reduce demand for all types of raw materials.
  • The modern petrochemical and chemical industries will also be useful here, as crude oil and natural gas are the raw materials whose acquisition is much less harmful to the environment than the acquisition of available alternative materials.

In each of these areas, the next 20 years are bound to see technological black swans that will change the rules of the game. Twenty years ago, no one expected that the fracking technology would transform the global markets for natural gas and crude oil, resulting in the undersupply of these hydrocarbons giving way to oversupply. Over the past 20 years, wind and solar energy generation technologies have been slowly building their commercial potential. And technological progress is rapidly accelerating. Who knows, perhaps in 20 years wind and solar energy generation technologies will be overtaken by controlled nuclear fusion, which, with the expenditure concentrated on a few reactors, is taking giant strides forward.

In far future, we will be making money from innovations, and this is where we see our big role. Carbon neutrality cannot be achieved by 2050 without developing innovative proprietary technologies. By investing in R&D&I today, we finance the materialisation of a distant future. The problem is that we are moving in an uncharted territory, not knowing whether we will be able to find the necessary solutions before the world surprises us by changing the rules of the game.

Another area of uncertainty related to the development of new technologies is uncertainty about how they will be received by the public. As has been said before, it is consumers who will ultimately dictate the pace of the transition by accepting (buying) or rejecting innovative solutions offered by industry. There are numerous examples of consumers’ negative attitudes to new technologies due to more or less justified concerns about their adverse effects, which are frequently provoked by businesses, industries or services threatened by the energy transition. Examples are many, especially in Europe: concerns over underground storage of carbon dioxide, well fracturing, 5G technology, or even vaccination.

Consumers’ concerns with regard to novel technologies and solutions, as well as the power play between new and mature technologies, lead to another area of uncertainty, namely regulatory uncertainty.It has a number of dimensions that energy sector companies are very well familiar with. In general, the regulatory regime forces businesses to take certain, often costly, measures to protect consumers’ (public) interest, which they would otherwise not take. Regulatory uncertainty about new, innovative technologies supporting the energy transition amplifies these risks. Innovative solutions that develop into new products, services and markets are by definition ‘outside regulation’, not to say in breach of many existing regulations created for mature markets. Regulating innovation requires an adaptive approach from the regulators, which should evolve as innovations mature. The first step is to answer the question whether an innovation is in the interest of consumers, that is whether the balance of costs and benefits will be positive for them. Then, it is good to let the innovation mature and subsequently work out the regulations in consultation with the innovative company, which knows more about the technology than the regulator. Uber would not have developed in Europe, and online communication would probably look different if the American regulator had not turned a blind eye to the breaking of Skype's telecommunications monopoly. The regulator also needs to tackle the issue of public response to innovations, especially in the context of concerns, as an average person usually focuses on risks before noticing the benefits.

Economic and geopoliticaluncertainties

As stated above, energy transition requires large capital expenditures, especially on new innovative technologies, and businesses need to first make money to be able to afford them. We have also said that because of the high asset inertia in the energy sector, over the next decade businesses will need to rely on the assets they already have. Because we want to grow and change, in the future we will need to make money also on assets that are not yet in our portfolio but have already been invented and are available in the market. We call this investing in strategic growth areas, because the problem, or the source of value, is not to invent the technology, but to correctly identify the investment focus, in line with mega trends and the goal of reaching the carbon neutral position by 2050. Those are assets that we intend to develop during this decade to provide revenue streams in the decades to come. They include petrochemicals, renewable Energy, gas-fired Energy, and non-fuel retail. Those assets, and specifically the markets in which they operate, are affected by the economic and geopolitical uncertainties in a shorter time horizon of up to five years.

In a nutshell, we are seeing the following trends likely to drive the situation in the commodity markets in which we are present now: the markets for crude oil and fuels, petrochemical raw materials and electricity.

  • The world is changing, with the centre of global economic growth and technologies shifting from the US and Europe to China and Asia. The largest population growth rates are seen in Africa, where the climate change is most severe, while Europe, with its ageing demography, is under increasing migration pressure.
  • The COVID-19 pandemic has broken many inter-continental supply chains. The ‘just in time’ logistics models have been linked to or supplemented with ‘just in case’ models, increasing the current costs of economic activity but reducing the risk of interrupted supplies and the related costs. The continuing digitisation, which is in the intensive investment phase, builds the potential to reduce the cost of activity and enhances the ability to respond promptly to changes as they emerge.
  • Capital is flowing to areas where the growth rates are higher and where real interest rates are positive. The capital flow from the US and the EU to China and Asia strengthens RNB against other currencies. This time, China is refraining from measures to control appreciation of its currency, which is reflected in the weakening US dollar exchange rate.
  • The stronger RNB is translating into higher prices of Chinese products all over the world, both in the case of consumer goods (imported inflation in the US and the EU) and electronics and RES technologies, which drives up the cost of energy transition as the lion’s share of such equipment in the US and Europe originate from China and Asia.
  • The rate and cost of energy transition depend on access to scarce minerals and metals produced in China and Asia.

Uncertainty onoil and fuel markets

  • The effects of the pandemic led to a decline in demand for fuels from transport, and refineries responded with a sharp reduction of their crude oil purchases. The current balance on the oil market has been restored through major production cuts, which pushed up oil prices. Price growth is under pressure from existing crude oil and fuel stocks (limiting current production growth), as well as increased reserves in hydrocarbon fields (ready for immediate production by OPEC countries and Russia).

  • Refineries have reduced their fuel output in line with current demand, but have not yet adjusted their production capacities to the permanent decrease in fuel demand from the transport sector. The high share of idle refining capacities is weighing on fuel prices, as well as product and refining margins. It is estimated that the global refining industry’s production capacities should be reduced by 3.8 mbd by the end of 2024. This estimate takes into account the new refineries that are to be placed in service during that period, mainly in the Middle East and Asia, whose potential is estimated at 5.7 mbd. In 2020, just over 2.2 mbd of refining capacity was decommissioned globally. For a more significant reduction to materialise, refining margins need to remain low, below the profitability threshold for many refineries. Independent European refineries that sell fuels to seaports are most exposed to the capacity reduction risk, as they compete directly with fuel supplies from refineries in the Middle East and Asia. Integrated inland refineries, which are links in longer value chains, are least exposed.

  • Demand for liquid fuels is weakening in the long term due to structural reasons. The efficiency of combustion in ICE engines and performance per 100 km (due to hybridisation) are improving, the share of biofuels and alternative fuels produced outside refineries is increasing, as is the share of electric cars in the total number of passenger vehicles, and demand forecasts take into account the development of alternative drives, including ones using hydrogen. The shrinking market means deteriorating prospects for hydrocarbon production, which discourages investment although crude oil will still be needed in transport. This situation makes oil prices more susceptible to changes and generates price cycles.

  • Crude oil production activity in the US is currently dictated by Saudi Arabia and Russia, as these two countries have regained control over oil prices, which determine production levels in the US.

  • An economic rebound in the US and increase in fuel demand after the pandemic will cause the US position to change from that of net oil exporter to net oil importer. Crude oil production in the US declined sharply in 2020 (by nearly 3 mbd). A recovery is made difficult by market sentiments turned against investing in oil production and the Joe Biden administration’s new US Energy Strategy, which assumes acceleration of energy transition. Instead of supporting production recovery (which was done during Donald Trump's administration), the US are likely to take measures to reduce domestic demand for oil.

  • Brent oil prices are expected to range from USD 50/bbl to USD 80/bbl in the coming years.China is the largest oil consumer. In 2020, China took advantage of the low prices and purchased crude oil on a huge scale. Its oil imports were record high, up 7.3% year on year, despite the impact of the pandemic in China at the beginning of 2020 and no import data for January and February 2020. The highest volumes of Chinese crude oil imports were seen in the period May−September 2020. With its existing oil reserves China can maintain an active procurement policy. It is estimated that China ceases to buy oil and uses its stocks when the prices reach USD 80/bbl, while this is a price level that encourages investment in production in the US. With prices at USD 50/bbl, China rebuilds its stocks and OPEC and Russia cut supplies.

The likely underinvestment in production will result (through asset cycles) in a large susceptibility of oil prices to changes, which, given the overcapacity of refineries and the difficulty in passing oil price hikes onto fuel prices, will be reflected in increased dependence of refining margins on changes in oil prices.

Fuelsand petrochemicals

  • Petrochemicals are the oil industry segment that is expected to grow faster than GDP. As discussed above, the world needs materials, and their production from crude oil and natural gas is more environment- and climate-friendly than production of the required materials from alternative inputs. This is why the global potential of the petrochemical business is growing, while expectations of low prices of gasoline and naphtha relative to oil prices over the next few years increase the attractiveness of naphtha -based petrochemicals.

  • On a global scale, experts even speak of a potential risk of overinvesting in the petrochemicals segment, by analogy to the situation that occurred in the global oil industry in connection with the IMO regulation, when the decline in demand was accompanied by the emergence of a new bunker fuel, pushing bunker diesel out of the market.

  • We believe that in Central Europe, the risk of overinvesting in the base petrochemicals is mitigated by the shortening of supply chains and using local sources of raw materials.

  • Petrochemical margins should remain close to their past ten years’ average. The increase in petrochemical margins in 2015–2018 was exceptional and due to a sudden decline in oil prices following the shale revolution.

  • Fluctuations in petrochemical margins in the short term will be driven by the expected higher volatility of oil prices.

Powergeneration

  • Electricity prices will be driven by two factors related to energy transition. On the one hand, we will probably see growth in the prices of emission allowances and their average price of approximately EUR 35/tonne in 2021–2025 (with significantly higher prices expected over a longer term, at approximately EUR 50/tonne). On the other hand, the rising share of wind and solar energy in Poland’s energy mix will reduce the wholesale cost of energy, which is based on the national merit order curve, dominated by coal-fired generation. Against this background, gas-fired cogeneration is expected to become a source of predictable revenue with a stabilising effect on the Company’s financial performance.

Dr. Adam B. Czyżewski
Chief Economist, PKN ORLEN
March 2021

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